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WESTERN LIBERAL LEGALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA*
Dr. Narnia Bohler-Muller∗

Much of the development in human rights is today reflected and understood
through the lens of the meta-narrative of western legal liberalism, which
inherently inhibits the full progress and utility of the rights discourse. Legalism
and formalism work to legitimise the law, and make transformation and
alternative formulations of notions of equality and rights impossible, thus
perpetuating a status quo that ignores the empowerment of subaltern groups.
This article argues in favour of changing the lens through which we appreciate
law and legal processes today. Looking at the constitution of post apartheid
South Africa, and subsequent case law, the author introduces the theoretical
tool of an ethical reading of the traditional legal concepts - this moves away
from interpreting the notions of equality and rights within established metanarratives, making rights more meaningful and empowering.

Introduction
This contribution focuses on legal and constitutional transformation in postapartheid South Africa and the need for the identification and utilisation of
sites of resistance within (and outside) the law. Just as the founding violence
persists in law, so does the founding dream that things could be otherwise,
different – be thought anew.1 This dreaming tends to be concealed and
suppressed by injunctions to accept things as they are and to give up faith in the
possibility that there exists something better. Ultimately then, the revolutionary
or radical beyond of the law could also be seen to be contained within the law.
It is therefore our ethical task to attach ourselves to the law (as we continue to
consider our very detachment from the letter of the law) through a belief in the
dream rather than through a perverse enjoyment of its founding violence. I call
This article is an amended version of a chapter in my doctoral thesis entitled Developing a
New Jurisprudence of Gender Equality in South Africa. My sincere appreciation to my
supervisor, Karin van Marle, for her inspiration and guidance.
*

∗

Professor of Law, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

CIXOUS, THREE STEPS ON THE LADDER OF WRITING 107 (Cornell and Sellers trans., 1993) writes on
the novelty of dreams and dreaming:
1

Like plants, dreams have enemies, plant lice that devour them. The dream’s
enemy is interpretation … We must let ourselves be carried on the dream’s
mane and must not wake up – something all dreamers know – while the dream
is dictating the world to us.
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here for the recognition of new ethical interpretations of the law, human rights
and gender equality, which reach beyond the hierarchical dichotomies of the
enlightenment2 in order to embrace diversity and different views of reality
within the post-apartheid South African context. In pursuit of a new style of
thinking, I seek to re-figure and ethically re-interpret the right to gender
equality3 whilst keeping in mind the tension between the violence and the
dream of law, as “[c]entral to a critical enquiry in law is the paradox or tension
between law’s potential and law’s limits.”4
Liberal dualisms or opposing pairs are hierarchical where the first part of the dichotomy is
privileged over the second. Often the dualisms are sexualised in that the first part is identified
with the ‘superior’ male and the second part with the ‘inferior’ female. The law is also usually
identified with the dominant male side of the opposing pair. This leads to the privileging of
male attributes, although this privileging is often obscured as it is accompanied by the
romanticisation of ‘womanliness’. Examples are rational/irrational; active/passive;
thought/feeling; reason/emotion; culture/nature; power/sensitivity; objective/subjective;
abstract/contextual; principled/personal and so on. Feminist legal theorists either argue for the
rejection of gender dualisms, where they accept the validity of the binary system and its
hierarchical structure but do not accept the coupling of women with the inferior side of the
binary (the so-called liberal ‘reformists’), or they reject the hierarchical structure of the
dualisms (the so-called ‘difference’ feminists), or they wish to transcend the oppositions
altogether. The latter feminists would prefer androgyny to the current system of gender
identifications. If we argue for the transcendence of liberal dichotomies, we then need to
consider the role of the law under a non-dichotomous perception of reality. This is one of the
considerations in this thesis. See generally Olsen, The sex of law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453-467 (Kairys ed., 1990).
2

3

§ 9 of the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that:
9(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law;
9(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
designated to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken;
9(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth;
9(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination;
9(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.

Van Marle, Gender mainstreaming – An ethical feminist consideration 12 (2005)
(unpublished manuscript in author’s possession). Van Marle rightly places emphasis on the
need to ‘call things into question’. Throughout this journey I keep in mind the dangers of
“incorporationism” which Scales describes as a process through which marginal voices are
made to believe that they now have a place within the existing system. See also Scales, The
emergence of a feminist jurisprudence: An essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1382 (1986).
4
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I open the critique by addressing the problems inherent in western,
positivistic jurisprudential thought. Objective and abstract styles of legal
reasoning are challenged and re-thought and an argument is forwarded for the
transformation of the legal system, which in turn forces us to confront the
ethical considerations of the law’s violent dealings with actual human beings. It
is thus not a naïve endorsement of the law and its capacity, but a reminder of
the violent limits positive law imposes on the future of a justice yet-to-come.5
Placing the critique in context, I turn to the legal utopianism of Costas
Douzinas and outline his (ethical) postmodern response to enlightenment
thinking in the human rights domain. According to Douzinas, human rights
should comprise a critique of positive law and institutionalised systems of
rights, but unfortunately:
Legal thinking has abandoned transcendence, has condemned
natural law to the history of ideas, has tamed justice and has
become an accountancy of rules.6
In the face of this loss described by Douzinas and the necessity for
transformation, I turn to an exploration of the nature of the South African
Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 – widely believed to be transformatory in its
nature - and in particular the interpretation(s) of the right to gender equality.7
The failure of the Constitutional Court to fully embrace ethical interpretations
of equality raises a number of concerns I address in detail. In particular I
analyse post-apartheid transformative constitutionalism and the possibilities
inherent in post-liberal human rights and equality discourse.8
Van Marle, Lives of action, thinking and revolt – A feminist call for politics and becoming in
post-apartheid South Africa, 19 S. AFR. PUB. L. 605, 607 (2004).
5

DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS 374 (2000). See also Douzinas, Human rights and
postmodern utopia 200 LAW AND CRITIQUE (2000) and Van Marle, In support of a revival of
utopian thinking, the imaginary domain and ethical interpretation, 2 TYDSKRIF VIR SUIDAFRIKAANSE REG/J. S. AFR. L. 501 (2002).
6

7

Davies understands transformation as follows:
“Transformation which is based on the continuing evaluation and
modification of a complex material and ideological environment cannot be
reduced to a scientific theory of change, like those of evolution or the halflife of radioactive substances … practical change occurs within a climate of
serious reflection, and diversity of opinion is in my view absolutely essential
as a stimulus to theory.”

See DAVIES, ASKING THE LAW QUESTION: THE DISSOLUTION OF LEGAL THEORY 205 (2002).
Van Marle, supra note 6, at 605-606, draws our attention to the dilemma that the
enthusiastic embracing of human rights contributes to “an absence of action, thinking and
revolt”. I submit in this chapter that this may indeed be so, but that we should also, somehow,
8
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The South African Constitutional Court has abandoned formal
interpretations of gender equality in favour of substantive interpretations, but I
argue below that this approach does not have far-reaching enough effects. The
central assertion is that this fundamental right should be interpreted ethically
along the lines of assertions made by Drucilla Cornell and Karin van Marle.
In moving towards the development of an utopian and ethical jurisprudence
of care it is necessary to recognise from the outset that western law has
evangelical, hegemonic and patriarchal tendencies which impact negatively on
those who do not fit the ‘ideal’ of the law of western men. Accordingly, in
order to listen to and respond to the different voices of others, there is a need
for ethical spaces of openness to difference, care and compassion.
Finally, I suggest a way forward, a path which could lead to less exclusions
and, hopefully, the prising open of spaces in which the courts and lawyers
would be convinced to take responsibility when faced with the suffering of the
concrete other.9 Should the pivotal points change, adjudicators may no longer
feel comfortable hiding behind legal texts and tests, and may begin to
understand the importance of a “politics of becoming”.10 This shift requires us
to abandon the dictates of an already existing language or world and to
experience the wonderment of listening-to and being-with others.11

I. A critique of dominant legal narratives
And their judges spoke with one dialect,
But the condemned spoke with many voices.
hold onto the dream of a better future promised by human rights, whilst at the same time not
closing off spaces for “continuous contestation and questioning”.
See generally, BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN
(1992) is critical of the belief that moral (and legal) subjects are isolated
beings who are essentially context-free. She envisages a relationship between the generalised
and the concrete other along a continuum. In the first place, there is the universalistic
commitment to the consideration of every human individual as being equally worthy of moral
and legal respect (at 10). This is an example of the recognition of civil, legal and political
rights. On the other hand, the standpoint of the concrete other requires one to think from the
context of the ethical relationship of, for example, a spouse, sister, mother and so on. If these
standpoints exist along a continuum, extending from universal respect at the one end to care
at the other, then the privileging of traditional theories of universalism in the legal domain, as
elsewhere, need to the re-thought. People should be dealt with as they are - always already
immersed in the life-world.
9

CONTEMPORARY ETHICS

10

Van Marle, supra note 6, at 606.

11

See IRIGARAY, THE WAY OF LOVE x-xi (Bostic and Pluhacek trans., 2002).
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And the prisons were full of many voices,
But never the dialect of the judges.
And the judges said:
‘No one is above the Law.’ 12
In this section, I raise some concerns about the unquestioning adherence to
the dominant legal theories of legalism, formalism and positivism. At the risk
of discarding altogether ‘conceptual pureness’, I concentrate on the
interrelations between these theories and their combined tendency to silence
that which does not conform to pre-determined rules within the closed system
of a legal ‘reality’. It is not possible in this restrictive space to reflect upon all
the criticisms of these ‘modernist’ legal theories, and it is not my intention to
do so.
Legalism represents the ‘official version’ (metanarrative) of the law – law’s
explanation of itself. Marinos Diamentides describes legalism as follows:
‘Law’ has a life of its own and ... it arrives at a judgement by
means of an almost mechanical process. It claims the closure of
legal meaning which it purports to be contained in the stillness of
the letter of the law that is universally applicable.13
Related to this metanarrative, and supported by it, is the belief that the law
is a closed logical system. Such an approach is supposed to protect the domain
of law and its objectivity and independence. This approach, labelled as
formalism, is again related to the idea of the existence of a legal science and so
lays claim to the possibility of the objective determination of disputes.
Following this line of thinking, other perspectives and other worldviews are
simply excluded. Differences are not only ridiculed, but also simply not heard
as they do not ‘fit’ into the dominant, objective version of Legal Truth.
Similarly, the doctrine of legal positivism formulates law as a determinable
and empirical science. This entails an outright rejection of the law having a
LEONARD, SITUATIONS THEORETICAL AND CONTEMPORARY, quoted in Maley, Beyond the law: The
justice of deconstruction, 10 L. & CRITIQUE 49, 59-60 (1999).
12

Marinos Diamantides, Ethics in law: Death marks on a still life: A vision of judgement as
vegetating, 195 L. & CRITIQUE 209. It is suggested that lawyers find an alternative to
traditional legal theory as the precepts of determinacy, objectivity and neutrality have failed
us and, in the light of this failure, we need to imagine new ways to live together. See Singer,
The player and the cards: Nihilism and legal theory, 1 YALE L.J. 9, 266 (1984). Singer
submits that “[w]e cannot answer our question of how to live together by applying a noncontroversial rational method. We will have to take responsibility for making up our minds”.
13
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metaphysical or natural existence. In this sense, positivism merely reinforces
the legal status quo by placing unquestionable faith in the legal canon.
I submit here that legalism, formalism and positivism serve the same end,
namely to legitimise the Authority of Law in such a way as to render
transformation impossible. Law, like science, is seen to be objective, neutral
and certain. What is not acknowledged is that this is merely another
perspective or way of seeing and being in the world. Thus legal and scientific
truth is constructed within a particular context. Once this view is accepted,
alternative interpretations become possible.
To illustrate, if we continue to understand the law in terms of legalism,
formalism and positivism, we continue to ignore the process of becoming. D.H.
Lawrence expresses this using the metaphor of the “regulation cabbage”:
… we are like the hide-bound cabbage going rotten at the heart
… we hang back, we dare not even peep forth, but, safely shut up
in bud, safely and darkly and snugly enclosed, like the regulation
cabbage, we remain secure till our hearts go rotten, saying all the
while how safe we are.14
Although Lawrence’s poetic assertions could be read as wholly anarchist in
nature, it is also possible to read his text ethically as reflecting a concern about
state power and authority and a certain understanding of the law. If we were
able to “peep forth” from our place “shut up in a bud” we may be able to
imagine law’s becoming.
In practice, legalism, formalism and positivism remain the dominant
language(s) of the western world and the typical outlook of most western legal
professionals and academics. Here we encounter another relation, that with
traditional liberalism. Legal positivism in particular is perceived to be
fundamental to the constitution of western legal thought. Positivist
jurisprudence is congenial to those who seek to defend rightist economic
liberalism as positivism is the ultimate guarantor of the ‘free’ market and as it
is perceived to be removed from the arena of politics, morality and ethics. It is
the key reason why lawyers come to accept the ‘official’ story of law as legal
reality and why they tend not to question the nature and purpose of law, but
LAWRENCE, STUDY OF THOMAS HARDY AND OTHER ESSAYS 11 (1985). Lawrence here is
interestingly targeting the laws proposed by the suffragettes. Although he sees their struggle
for emancipation and empowerment to be a worthy one, he also maintains that they are
missing the point. Something other than increased regulation should be attempted. See also
Davies, supra note 8, at 24-25.
14
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take it as a given. It also helps to explain why the law comes to assume the
status of objectivity and why judges become the seekers of universal Truth in
the Platonic sense of the word.15
It is submitted that these dominant doctrines leave legal theory and the
‘practice’ of law itself impoverished. The unwillingness on the part of lawyers
to address the social, moral and political components of law is problematic as it
leads to an uncritical acceptance of the functioning of law within any given
society thereby perpetuating the status quo, which may be anything but ideal.
The formal requirements of valid law are seen as all-important and, for the
largest part, its content is ignored. Positivism may also be seen to legitimate
the refusal of most judges to consider the extent to which their particular
worldviews inform their decisions.
Consequently, lawyers need to seek alternatives to traditional legal theory,
as the precepts of determinacy, objectivity and neutrality (the superior sides of
modernist dichotomies) have failed us and, in the light of this failure, we
should imagine new ways of living together as equals:
[B]y recognising the impossibility of easy, logical answers we
can free ourselves to think about the questions in a more
constructive and imaginative manner. Law cannot be successfully
separated from politics, morals, and the rest of human activities,
which is an integral part of the web of social life.16
The overlapping and interwoven problems outlined above tend to convince
that we need to move beyond western liberalism and legal positivism if we
hope to embrace the diversity within and around us as legal subjects and
lawyers. It is also important to move beyond these unstated norms, as the
continued application of the law ‘as it is’ contributes to the continued
oppression of women and other marginalised groups and individuals.17
CAVARERO, FOR MORE THAN ONE VOICE: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF VOCAL EXPRESSION 8, 13,
(Kottmann trans., 2005) places in question the tradition of metaphysics since Plato which has
posited a philosophical affinity for “an abstract and bodiless universality” where the word
”does not come out of any throat of flesh”. This programmatic lack of attention to the
uniqueness of the voice, is, according to Cavarero a way of preserving the canonical text at
the expense of understanding the act of speaking as relational.
15

16

Olsen, Feminism and critical legal theory: An American perspective, in FEMINIST
1 473 (Olsen ed., 1995).

LEGAL

THEORY VOL.

Young identifies the five faces of oppression as exploitation, marginalisation,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. See YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 48-63 (1990). To illustrate the fact that the discourse of oppression makes sense of
much of our social experience, Young analyses oppression as a social construction. She opens
17
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Legalist/formalist/positivist jurisprudence also relies on a liberal and closed
textual interpretation of human rights discourse. The problems with this
particular aspect of the vernacular are discussed in more detail in the following
paragraphs.

II. The Text of the Law and Human Rights
Western liberal legalism constructs the unitary subject (atomistic
individual) of the law and human rights discourse where this subject is in
conflict with others, and yet formally equal to them. Freedom and autonomy as
the values of this form of legalism spring from feelings of vulnerability and the
fear that the existence of an other could lead to the annihilation of the self.
Therefore, emphasis is placed on enforcing human rights against others, and
consequently duties and responsibilities take a back seat. The ‘holders’ and
‘enforcers’ of rights are reduced to the generalised white, middle-class male
who determine when and how harm is done and to whom. This reductionist
approach to law renders women and other ‘outsider’ groups and individuals, as
well as the subversives, subalterns and subterraneans amongst us, silent.18
In an attempt to decentre the centre, the underlying thesis developed here is
that community, compassion and care – valued traditionally in the private
sphere - need to be (re)introduced into legal and human rights discourse in
order to break the silence. In other words, a privileging of uncertainty and
fluidity is needed in order to re-imagine and reconstruct the legal domain.19 If
this is achieved, there would no longer be clear boundaries between self and
other or subject and object. This new way of thinking has the potential to lead
her chapter entitled “Five faces of oppression” by quoting from Weil:
Rape is a terrible caricature of love from which consent is absent. After rape,
oppression is the second horror of human existence. It is a terrible caricature
of obedience.
See, for example LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 44,
193 (1998). She argues that we must try to alter law so as to make it more receptive to the
arguments of the powerless (p.44). She also supports the transformation of law for it to
become more “polyphonous” and inclusive (p.193).
18

IRIGARAY, THINKING THE DIFFERENCE 78 (Montin trans., 1994) makes a speculative appeal for
the development of sexuate rights or women’s laws in order to unsettle the legal system as a
whole. She relies on the notion of ‘femininity’ as a condition of disorder and disruption and
thus centralises sexual difference in her thinking on rights. These rhetorical arguments have
been a part of Irigaray’s work for many years and culminates in her conception of ecriture
feminine which seeks to recover the repressed feminine, the unacknowledged body and give
them a place within language. Her work in this area is particularly provocative. See also
IRIGARAY, AN ETHICS OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Burke and Gill trans. 1993).
19
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us to connection(s) – the flowing and blending of boundaries that both separate
and connect us.
However, as mentioned previously, the ‘body’ of law is textual. Generally
speaking (if this is possible), legal authority is exercised at the expense of the
fleshiness of everyday lived experiences, and particularly the experiences of
women who are perceived as lacking and necessarily subordinate to the Law of
the Father. The multiplicity of the feminine experience has thus been rendered
marginal by the monotheistic, monovocal and paternalistic nature of the law.
Should the others of the law, such as women, wish to be heard they must
speak the language of their oppressors. In this way, unique voices are drowned
out or dismissed in favour of traditional legal texts and rules – denominations,
classifications and categories.20 The concern addressed below is that the
monovocality of the law as it is can only lead to injustice.
On the other hand, perspectival social reality can be (re)constructed through
a network of multiple stories hitherto unheard.21 For this reason, the
postmodern initiative convinces that the enlightenment project - which holds
that the world’s diverse communities have to see things the same way, the
rational way, the correct way - must be reconsidered.22

See Goodrich, Maladies of the legal soul: Psychoanalysis and the interpretation of law,
available at http://www.wlu.edu/-lawrev/text/543/Goodrich.htm.
20

2122

See Benhabib, Sexual difference and collective identities: The new global constellation in
VISIBLE WOMEN: ESSAYS ON FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 137 (James and
Palmer eds., 2002) where she states the following with regard to perspectival reality:
Others are not just the subject matters of my story: they are also tellers of
their own stories which compete with my own, unsettle my selfunderstanding, spoil my attempts to mastermind my own narrative.
Narratives cannot have closure precisely because they are always aspects of
the narratives of others, the sense that I create for myself is always immersed
in a fragile ‘web of stories’ that I as well as others spin.
It is important to note that relinquishing the universal Truth does not mean that we are left
with nothing: “[r]ather postmodernism promotes social criticism: from a postmodern
perspective everything is open to challenge, including postmodernism.” See ANDERSON,
CONVERSATION, LANGUAGE AND POSSIBILITIES 37 (1996). Postmodernism is not against other
schools of thought. It only challenges their attitudes to alternative truths. As Gergen argues:
“(W)e do not ask of Verdi or Mozart whether their operatic arias, duets and choruses are true,
but whether they can move us to ecstasy, sadness or laughter”. Gergen, The postmodern
adventure, NETWORKER 55, 57 (1992). Similarly we need not ask if a metanarrative is true to
us, but rather whether it can move us to accommodate those who differ from us. The necessity
for a careful reconsideration of that which is universally correct has become even more
urgent in the light of G.W. Bush’s totalitarian attitudes and actions. His belief that “you are
either with us or against us” boils down to the fact that if you are not ‘with us’ you are a
terrorist, the friend of terrorists, or might as well be.
22
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Should we choose to declare the victory of western liberalism and the end
of history23 we choose also closure and what Costas Douzinas refers to as the
end of the utopian and transformative possibilities of a human rights culture.24
Following this Douzinasian utopianism, instead of declaring the wholesale
victory of western liberalism after apartheid, it is essential to (re)interpret
human rights and the right to gender equality within the ‘new’ South African
context, taking into account difference(s), and the need to care responsibly for,
with and towards others, without denying the inherent worth of the person or
the value of diversity.

III. The South African Constitution(s) and the ‘end’ of
Apartheid
We cannot stop criticising the present and we cannot do that
without adopting the position of the future; but similarly, we can
never remove ourselves sufficiently from our here and now to
adopt the redemptive position.25
The post-apartheid South African Constitution(s)26 require lawyers to
abandon the formalism, objectivism and reductionism that characterised the

23

FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 46 (1992). The danger of declaring the
victory of liberalism and liberal human rights is reflected in Fukuyama’s statement that the
purpose of history has come to an end:
…today, we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our
own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist. We cannot
picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the present one,
and at the same time better.
KEARNEY, ON STORIES (2002) warns that this belief that ‘the end’ has finally come is a
dangerously totalitarian attitude. In his response to the nihilistic postmodern claim that we are
at the ‘end of storytelling’, Kearney argues that what we need at this very time is an
alternative model of narrative where we recognise and respond to the identity of the who
addressing us. Kearney relies on the work of Ricoeur in coming to his conclusions. (See also
RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE VOL. 3 (1988) and ONESELF AS ANOTHER (1992)). Although
Kearney does not mention Cavarero’s contribution towards a theory of narratable identity, his
thoughts on the subject reflect, albeit from a critical hermeneutic tradition, similar concerns
about stories as relational and unique:
The story told by a self about itself tells about the action of the ‘who’ in
question: and the identity of this ‘who’ is a narrative one.
24

See generally DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000).

25

Douzinas, Human rights and postmodern utopia, L. & CRITIQUE 200, 238 (2000).

26

The interim Act 200 of 1993 and the final Act 108 of 1996.
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law under the previous oppressive regime.27 These Constitutions and their Bills
of Rights have been hailed as bridges from the past to the future – a triumph of
human rights. However, in reclaiming the both past and present it is necessary
to re-think the world and our place in it in terms of a future-directedness.
In his insightful discussion of the notion of a transition to a constitutional
democracy Andre van der Walt analyses the metaphor of the South African
Constitution as a bridge between the past of unfair discrimination and the
future of constitutionalism.28 The ‘Post-amble’ to the 1993 interim Constitution
introduces the metaphor of a bridge as follows:
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a
deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold
suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of
colour, race, class, belief or sex.29
Ettienne Mureinik extends this conception of the interim Constitution as a
bridge that facilitates the transition from a culture of authority to a culture of
justification, entrenching the image of the Constitution as a bridge that spans
the abyss of potentially violent transition.30 This interpretation of the bridge
metaphor has become established in South African constitutional discourse and
in popular consciousness as a powerful image for social, political and legal
transformation and progress. The bridge is thus seen as “an instrument of
escape and liberation, of linear movement from old to new, from inside to
outside…”.31 Regarded in this way, the bridge metaphor is the expression of a
wish to break away from a violent and divided past and to complete the
transition, once crossed. The point of the exercise is to cross the bridge – make
the transition and get it over and done with. It is a process of forgetting.
27

See Botha, Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (Part 2), 1 TYDSKRIF
SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG/J. S. AFR. L. 20 (2003).

VIR

Van der Walt, Dancing with codes – Protecting, developing and deconstructing property
rights in a constitutional state, 118(2) J. S. AFR. L. 258 (2001).
28

29

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. My emphasis.

See Mureinik, A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR, J. HUM.
RTS. 31, 31-32 (1994). For an analysis of Murienik’s notion of the switch from a culture of
authoritarianism to the constitutional culture of justification, see Van der Walt and Botha,
Democracy and rights in South Africa: Beyond a constitutional culture of justification, 7
CONSTELLATIONS 341 (2000).
30

31

Van der Walt, supra note 29, at 260.
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Although many constitutional theorists subscribe to this interpretation of the
bridge metaphor as crossing from old to new and not looking back, Van der
Walt argues that this metaphor places a particular theoretical spin on the
discourse of constitutional transformation. This theoretical spin denies and
suppresses other (utopian) interpretations of, and discourses about, transition
and constitutionalism.32 Van der Walt thus deconstructs this dominant
metaphor of transformative constitutionalism by establishing that the image of
apartheid land law and of transformative land law as two stationary positions
on either side of the bridge is unsuitable. He introduces a new metaphor – that
of dancing/movement:33
However, even when we trade the static imagery of position,
standing, for the more complex imagery of dancing, we still have
to resist the temptation to see transformation as linear movement
or progress – from authoritarianism to justification, from one
dancing code to another, or from volkspele jurisprudence to toyitoyi jurisprudence… I suggest that we should not only switch to a
more complex metaphorical code such as dancing when
discussing transformation, but that we should also deconstruct the
codes we dance to; pause to reflect upon the language in terms of
which we think and talk and reason about constitutionalism,
about rights, and about transformation, and recognize the
liberating and the captivating potential of the codes shaping and
shaped by that language.34
Van der Walt convinces that we should “continually dare to imagine
alternatives” and to “open our imagination to the possibility that things can be
different.”35 In this sense he endorses the understanding of human rights as
instruments of ethics. Human rights should thus reflect ethical concerns for the
other and the duty to respect the singular and unique experiences of the other.
32

Van der Walt, supra note 29, at 261.

Van der Walt, supra note 29, at 262. Here Van der Walt makes reference to the popular
‘madiba jive’.
33

34

Van der Walt, supra note 29, at 262-263.

Van der Walt, supra note 29, at 263. As he states “[o]nce clear meanings are out of the
house, we can allow language to dance on the table”. This approach may then allow us to
speak to the other in the language of the other – that is, without naming and appropriating
with words but by turning to a language which creates new meanings. IRIGARAY, supra note
12, at ix, also concentrates on the need for a ‘new’ language. In this work she proposes ways
of preparing a place of proximity and nurturing ways to nearness which are dependent on the
transformation of speech and speaking-positions and related to the experience of listening-to.
35
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A human rights society in this sense would always look to re-definitions and
re-conceptualisations and to new possibilities and subjectivities:
[t]he time of such societies is the future because their principle is
always-still to be declared and met. But a society of human rights
operates also a (non-essential) theory of the good, and becomes a
community of obligation to the singular, unique other and her
concrete needs.36
The (im)possible justice of human rights is therefore based upon a position
of proximity and not disinterested detachment, on concern and closeness and
not abstract universality. The concrete needs of the other are what must come
first according to this interpretation.37
Human rights as utopian resistance creates new values and meanings and
make space for novel situations and stories rather than seeing transformation as
something that has already taken place by crossing the metaphorical bridge.
What follows is a closer analysis of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation
of the right to equality in order to establish whether this court has moved
beyond (masculinist) western jurisprudence and the tendency to forget. The
ensuing discussion is not exhaustive and forms the background for a continued
analysis.
i. The Constitutional Court’s Equality Jurisprudence Revisited

In President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo,38 Justice Goldstone
introduced the concept of “equal dignity” to the interpretation of equality
rights.39 He explains that the purpose of the prohibition on unfair discrimination
is to create a society in which the inherent dignity of individuals is protected:
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim
Constitution seeks not only to avoid discrimination against
people who are members of disadvantaged groups. It seeks more
than that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination
lies a recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and
democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all

36

Van der Walt, supra note 29, at 263.

37

Douzinas, supra note 26, at 380.

38

(1997) 6 B.C.L.R. 708 (CC).

39

Id. at ¶ 40-41.
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human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect,
regardless of their membership of particular groups.40
As a result of this focus on the dignity of the individual, the majority of the
Constitutional Court in Hugo found that an imprisoned father had not been
unfairly discriminated against as his dignity had not been impaired when only
mothers of children under the age of twelve years were released from prison
under a presidential pardon. This case illustrates the gender stereotyping still
prevalent in the reasoning of the Court as mothers were released to care for
their children, but fathers, such as Hugo, were left to serve out their prison
sentences as fathers are not perceived to be the nurturers of minor children.
Hugo was followed by Prinsloo v. Van der Linde41 and Harksen v. Lane42
where the Court adopted a similar approach to the one articulated by
Goldstone. As Warren Freedman puts it, the latter decisions appear to
reconfirm a more formal and individualistic approach to equality by once again
placing dignity at the centre of the enquiry into unfair discrimination.43
The problem with a formal interpretation of the right to (gender) equality
has been acknowledged by South African jurists and for this reason there have
been strong arguments to recognise a substantive interpretation of equality
which does not focus on individual dignity.44 Such an interpretation of the right
to equality requires contextual adjudication where historical disadvantage
forms a central concern. Concrete needs and circumstances are granted legal
importance and post-liberal philosophies influence to a limited extent the
interpretation of this right.

Id.at ¶ 41. The Justice adopted this view from the equality jurisprudence of the Canadian
Supreme Court in Egan v. Canada, (1995) 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609; (1995) 29 C.R.R. (2d) 79.
See also the judgment of L’Heureux-Dube J. in Egan v. Canada at 106 as well as the
judgment in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1998 12
B.C.L.R. 1517 (CC) at ¶ 27.
40

41

1997 6 B.C.L.R. 759 (CC).

42

1997 11 B.C.L.R. 1489 (CC), 1998 1 SA 300 (CC).

Warren Freedman, Formal versus substantive equality and the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517; 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), 63(2) TYDSKRIF VIR HEEDENDAAGSE ROMEINSHOLLANDSE REG/J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L. 314, 318 (2000). See also Davis’s criticism of
the connection between the rights of equality and dignity in Davis, Equality: The majesty of
legoland jurisprudence, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 396 (1999).
43

See Albertyn & Goldblatt, Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the
development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 248 (1998).
44
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ii. A Substantive Vision of Equality

Cathi Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt argue that the objective of equality is not
to recognise the inherent dignity of each individual, but to provide individuals
with the (equal) opportunity to advance and develop their human potential and
social, economic and legal interests:45
The challenge of achieving equality within this transformation
project involves the eradication of systemic forms of
discrimination and material disadvantage based on race, gender,
class and other forms of inequality.
It also entails the
development of opportunities which allow people to realise their
full human potential within positive social relationships.46
They therefore formulate the following as an alternative equality test:47
• The equal protection subsection of the clause must be interpreted
substantively in the light of a more integrated approach of the clause as
a whole.
• Discrimination must not be presumed but must be given its proper
connotation of harm and prejudice. Unlisted groups must be considered
on the basis of harm caused to the individual due to his or her

See id., at 254 where they maintain that the Constitutional Court has sought to define
equality by placing the value of dignity at the center of the equality right. The authors do not
agree with this approach and argue for the right to substantive equality to be given a meaning
independent of the value of dignity. The authors’ interpretation of equality promotes and
protects the ability of each human being to develop to his or her full human potential and to
forge mutually supportive human relationships. This approach appears to be in line with
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. According to Nussbaum, capabilities should be pursued
for each and every person, treating each person as an end and not as a tool for the ends of
others. She maintains that there is a close relationship between human capabilities and
fundamental human rights. Thus women in a particular country such as South Africa cannot
be seen to have the right to gender equality just because the right exists on paper. They only
have such a right if there are effective measures taken to make such women truly capable of
equality. Therefore thinking in terms of human capabilities provides a benchmark as we
consider what it means to secure a right to someone. This approach could lead us beyond the
recognition of formal equality to the achievement of substantive equality. See NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000). Nussbaum’s current list of
capabilities include life; bodily integrity; bodily health; senses, imagination and thought;
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s
environment. I submit, however, that Nussbaum’s attempts to establish minimum
requirements for human dignity is a flawed process as dignity is an inherent human quality
and cannot be ‘taken away’ or reduced to a list.
45

46

Albertyn & Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 249.

47

Albertyn & Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 273.
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membership of a group rather than with reference to the value of
dignity.
• The court should consider the location of the complainant within his/her
social group and the interests affected by the impugned act when
considering whether the impact of the act has resulted in (personal
and/or group) disadvantage.
• The court should look at whether the discrimination was permissible
(fair) or impermissible (unfair) by focussing on disadvantage rather than
on dignity. This stage of the enquiry should be based on moral and
political values underlying the equality right. If the act is found to be
unfair the limitations clause should then be used to consider whether the
act is justifiable for important social ends.48
Here the authors place less emphasis on liberal human rights discourse and
more emphasis on the need to determine the right to equality within social and
relational contexts. Their theoretical stance is underpinned by the belief that
societal stereotypes and patriarchal attitudes need to be addressed and
transformed. The historical location and societal context of the individual are
thus highly relevant, and group disadvantage an integral part of this alternative,
value-laden equality test. The individual before the law should not be seen as
atomistic, but situated, unique, concrete and interdependent.
Following these criticisms of the Constitutional Court’s equality
jurisprudence, the question of whether the Court should adopt a substantive or
formal interpretation of equality was again raised in National Coalition for Gay
and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice.49 The Court found in the latter case
that the common law and statutory offences of sodomy discriminated unfairly
against gay men on the basis of both gender and sexual orientation and could
not be justified in terms of the limitation clause of the final Constitution.
In an amicus curiae submission the Centre for Applied Legal Studies
(CALS) argued that by focussing on dignity, the Constitutional Court had not
given enough weight to the concept of substantive equality. It was further
argued that the Court should adopt a new interpretation of section 9 (the
equality clause), since its interpretation of section 8 of the interim Constitution
had failed to recognise substantive equality. Justices Ackermann and Sachs
§ 36 of the final Constitution Act 108 of 1996 and the previous § 33 of the interim
Constitution.
48

49

1998 12 B.C.L.R. 1517 (CC); 1999 1 S.A. 6 (CC).
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rejected the amicus curiae argument. Ackermann held that the Court has
recognised that the purpose of the equality clause is a remedial or restitutionary
one50 and Sachs J argued that the Court should continue to emphasise respect
for dignity when faced with equality infringements.51
In this latter case, therefore, the Court remains reluctant to embrace equality
as a right in its own right, but links the latter with the value of dignity. This
leads to a situation where the concept of equality has no unique and
independent meaning. It is submitted that the approach of protecting individual
dignity is not a practicable one if systemic forms of discrimination are not dealt
with initially. However the National Coalition case may also be perceived to be
a move in the right direction, especially in view of the following comment by
Ackermann, on behalf of the majority of the Court:
[I]n the final analysis, it is the impact of the discrimination on the
complainant or the members of the affected group that is the
determining factor regarding the unfairness of the
discrimination.52
The right and value of equality as recognised in our Bill of Rights is a
complex one, as illustrated above. The question remains—what does it mean to
legally guarantee equality for all? Does substantive equality go far enough
beyond formalism? These questions are addressed below against the backdrop
of Drucilla Cornell’s conviction that human rights law should reside within the
domain of the ethical.

IV. Ethical Interpretations of the Right to (Gender)
Equality
Feminism demands the enlarged mentality that allows the
imagination to run free.53
Cornell maintains that all human beings should be considered to be of equal
and unique worth.54 Her configuration of the “imaginary domain” as a right
50

Id. at ¶¶ 60, 61.

51

Id. at ¶¶ 126, 129.

52

See National Coalition, supra note 49, at ¶ 19.

53

CORNELL, JUST CAUSE: FREEDOM, IDENTITY, AND RIGHTS 7 (2000).

See in particular CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX, AND EQUALITY (1998)
[hereinafter CORNELL (1998)] and THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT (1995) [hereinafter CORNELL (1995)]
54

Vol. 3

Socio-Legal Review

2007

encourages us to grant each individual the chance to live a uniquely selfcreated life - an essential right of personality.55 The aesthetic idea(l) of the
imaginary domain denotes the psychic and moral space in which women as
“sexed creatures who care deeply about matters of the heart” are able to reimagine who they are for themselves.56
For Cornell the imaginary domain is the space of the ‘as if’ in which beings
imagine who they may be if they made themselves their own end.57 This
imaginary domain is the political and ethical basis of the self-representation of
one’s (sexuate) being. This links up with the Kantian ideal that the most
precious of rights is the right to freedom, but that individuals may be legally
coerced to harmonise their freedom with that of others.58 This subjective
account of rights has possibly been the most controversial in traditional human
rights discourse because it may be perceived to threaten the ideal of community
by replacing it with a western capitalist notion of the possessive and defensive
individual.59 Cornell, however, explains that the recognition of the imaginary
domain does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a subjective conception of
right. She acknowledges the importance of community and of close personal
relationships and argues that the right to represent one’s own (sexuate) being
allows intimate associations that have historically been prohibited by law.60
In her discussion of human rights, Cornell addresses the question as to
whether the imaginary domain is a western, liberal concept based on imperialist
principles and the central value of the individual.61 Her argument in defence of
the imaginary domain returns us to what John Rawls would call a philosophical
Cornell (1998), supra note 54. Cornell’s use of the term “imaginary domain” is interesting.
In the archaic sense of the word, a domain constitutes “landed property which one has in his
[sic] own right”. It is thus an indicator of possession or ownership. It is also an indicator of
control over something, a realm of human control or a mathematical aggregate. See Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1993 edn.,
Merriam-Webster). Using “imaginary” in conjunction with “domain” thus presents us with
what could be interpreted as an understanding of utopia. The imaginary domain is thus
according to this reading an imaginary but specific ‘place’ or ‘right to a place’ which cannot
be found on a Cartesian map.
55

56

Cornell (1998), supra note 54, at x.

57

Cornell (1998), supra note 54, at 8.

KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1956) is one of the foundations of modern
jurisprudence according to which the moral will is free because it finds all its determinations
in itself.
58

59

Cornell (1998), supra note 54, at 159.

60

Cornell (1998), supra note 54, at 167.

61

Cornell (1998), supra note 54, at 151ff.
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conception of our equal worth as persons.62 Women (and men) must be
“imagined and evaluated as free persons” and for this reason all forms of
egalitarian legislation must be tailored so as to be consistent with their
freedom.63
The imaginary domain is thus a utopian ideal - a vision of something truly
new, “a world in which we all share in life’s glories”.64 Cornell reminds us that
it is the dream itself that proves the possibility of change.65 She thus argues that
controversial legal and human rights issues should be understood in the light of
her imaginary domain which is the projected bodily integrity and sexual imago
that the psychoanalytic Lacanian “mirror stage” installs in each of us early in
life:66
The imaginary domain recognises that literal space cannot be
conflated with psychic space and reveals that our sense of
freedom is intimately tied to the renewal of the imagination as we
come to terms with who we are and who we wish to be as sexuate
beings. Since, psychoanalytically, the imaginary is inseparable
from one’s sexual imago, it demands that no-one be forced to
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972) wherein Rawls constructs the fiction of natural man
contracting behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that conceals all individualising characteristics from
the contractants. Rawls thus seeks to express his concept of justice by concentrating on what
people would agree to if they were free to make that choice. Rawls has been criticised for the
liberal individualism inherent in this theory. See BENHABIB, supra note 10, at 166-168 where
she states that Rawlsian agents behind the veil of ignorance are disembodied and
disembedded selves, who are expected to reason from the standpoint of everyone else in the
same position. She adds that “[n]either the concreteness nor the otherness of the “concrete
other” can be known in the absence of the voice of the other” (emphasis in the original).
62

63

CORNELL (1998), supra note 54, at 159.

64

CORNELL (1998) supra note 54, at 186.

65

CORNELL (1998), supra note 54, at 186.

See LACAN, THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1992). According to Freud’s Oedipal structure, the
subject comes into existence through the intervention of the father who disrupts the motherchild dyad by prohibiting the child’s desire for the mother. See Freud, Totem and taboo in THE
ORIGINS OF RELIGION (1985). Lacan reads this primary repression in linguistic terms. According
to him the primal union between mother and child is broken and the subject comes into being
by entering the symbolic order, typically a combination of language and law. The symbolic
separates baby from mother – something termed symbolic ‘castration’ – and this separation
causes loss, absence and lack within the self. This lack is however partially addressed through
the baby’s identification with signifiers, words and images. In the famous ‘mirror stage’ the
child between six and eighteen months experiences a sense of jubilation (jouissance) when
she first recognises her own image in a mirror or in the gaze of her (m)other and, through the
reflection, comes to identify with a whole and complete bodily existence. But this image is
external to the body and different from the child’s sensual experience of a disjointed body.
Thus identity and bodily integrity are not a given, but are constructed through a mirroring
process and the repeated recognition of self by the other who appears to be complete.
66

Vol. 3

Socio-Legal Review

2007

have another’s imaginary imposed upon herself or himself in
such a way as to rob him or her of respect for his or her sexuate
being.67
Furthermore, Cornell’s imaginary domain is a space of limited legal
intervention. This is useful in explaining the right to (sexual) respect and
integrity. No legal intervention is allowed that would impinge on the imaginary
domain of an individual. However, a universal position on these issues is
impossible and a uniform response to different and conflicting imaginary
domains is morally questionable.
In the South African context, Karin van Marle supports Drucilla Cornell’s
theory of the imaginary domain, equivalent rights and ethical feminism, which,
she believes, provides the best insight for the processes of reconstruction and
constitutional transformation in South Africa.68 Her theory provides for the
affirmation of the feminine (and feminine difference) without being
essentialist. In other words, ethical feminism is sensitive towards difference,
not only between men and women, but also among women themselves. Ethical
feminism is, according to Van Marle, sensitive to the multiple contexts, stories
and needs of our heterogeneous and historically divided society.
Ethical feminism, as described by Van Marle, relies on deconstruction’s
insights into language, justice and democracy. It focuses on women as beyond
our current systems of representation. This type of feminism seeks to
problematise and displace current stereotypical understandings of ‘woman’ and
the ‘feminine’. ‘Woman’ or the ‘feminine’ should remain other to the system
and should expose the flaws in the present system from a marginal ‘ethical’
position. Thus, the feminine in law should act as a utopian, disruptive and
critical force – a site of resistance:
If there is to be a feminism at all, as a movement unique to
women, we must rely on a feminine voice and a feminine
`reality’ that can be identified as such and correlated with the
lives of actual women. Yet all accounts of the feminine seem to
reset the trap of rigid gender identities, deny the real differences
among women (white women have certainly been reminded of
this danger by women of colour), and reflect the history of
67

CORNELL (1995), supra note 54, at 8.

See Van Marle, Some perspectives on sex, gender, difference and equality, S. AFR. PUB. L.
JOURNAL 461 (2000) and Van Marle, Towards an ethical interpretation of equality (2000)
(doctoral thesis) [hereinafter Van Marle, doctoral thesis].
68
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oppression and discrimination rather than an ideal to which we
ought to aspire. To solve this dilemma we must return to the
significance of the feminine.69
Cornell argues that the other side of the essentialist version of the feminine
is the liberal reaction that insists that women should be recognised as
individuals and as legal persons and not reduced to a specified gender identity.
This approach maintains that there are no shared female identities, only
individuals who happen to be women. The ‘ethical’ feminist reaction to this
approach is that this strategy to join forces with the dominant discourse
undermines the possibility of recognising the unnoticed/silent suffering of
women.
But how can the feminine (or any cultural difference for that matter) be
affirmed without relying on essentialist stereotypes? Cornell supports the
psychoanalytic approach that describes the feminine as a disruptive force.70
According to this approach the feminine is not celebrated because it is The
Feminine, but because it stands for the heterogeneity that undermines the “logic
of identify”.71 She claims that this position demonstrates how the feminine is
produced within a particular system of gender representation. The feminine
acts as a disruptive force, a promise that remains to be fulfilled. A journey to a
u-topia, a place which does not exist and yet a journey worth embarking upon.72
Ethically speaking, therefore, we need to be reminded that there is more to
the story(ies) of woman or other outsiders than meets the eye, and that there is
more than one dance. Therefore we should not attempt to introduce a new
monovocal way of representing women to replace previous ones. Because there
is no Ultimate Representation of Woman, the ‘truth’ of woman as absence or
lack should also be problematised. The feminine should act as a disruptive
force of the current system, and at the same time open a space for a future
where women’s stories can be heard with attentiveness and responsiveness.73
Cornell, The doubly-prized world: Myth, allegory and the feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644,
645 (1990).
69

70
71

Id, at 659.
See generally, ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (1973) for an analysis of this meta-logic.

The Xhosa proverb Kukude e-Bhakhuba is an indigenous illustration of this journey.
Directly translated it means “it is a great distance to Bhakubha”. Bhakhuba is a metaphoric
expression of a place both anywhere and nowhere – an imaginary place which suggests a
great distance from a longed-for place. See CALANA, XHOSA PROVERBS 42 (2002).
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CAVARERO, supra note 15, at 12, 207 explains that western systems of patriarchy have been
restrictive in their theorising of the voice “in general” at the expense of the body:
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V. A Return to the Call of the Ethical
Historically, the struggle for human rights and (gender) equality has been
the central focus of liberation movements. Recently, however, doubts have
arisen about the theoretical and practical implication of these rights.
Rights have been declared to be overly abstract, atomistic and conflictual;
they obscure male dominance and/or are bound up in the socio-linguistic
hierarchies of gender and with the outdated patriarchal vision of the unitary
self. I argue, however, that we can interpret rights differently without resorting
to meta-foundations for these theories. It is in fact important for us to expose,
by the process of deconstruction (a careful re-reading in this instance), the
illusions immanent in the modernist project as explained earlier in this article.
But I also submit that it is just as important for feminists to engage in some
kind of reconstruction in order to continue the struggle for political and legal
transformation. The task therefore is for critical and feminist legal scholars to
(re)establish some form of ethics. We need to re-think justice.
Karin van Marle is an exponent of an ethical interpretation of gender
equality74 based upon an understanding of Drucilla Cornell’s idea(l) of ethical
feminism. She explains the significance of the intersection between public
space, equality and justice, and submits that an “ethical approach to equality
needs a ‘slowness’, a ‘strategy of delay’, a careful reading”.75 Van Marle
understands the ethical as an “openness to difference and the acceptance of the
impossibility of ever fully knowing each other’s differences”.76 In her view, the
ethical imperative demands that we seek the least exclusionary or reductionist
interpretation of equality, in theory and in practice.

i. Van Marle’s challenge

Van Marle believes that the substantive approach to equality as outlined
above does not go far enough. I agree with this view. This substantive

For a radical rethinking of the classical connection between speech and
politics, especially from a feminist perspective, recuperating the theme of the
voice is therefore an obligatory strategic gesture.
74

Van Marle, doctoral thesis, supra note 68.
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Van Marle, doctoral thesis, supra note 68, at 161.
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Van Marle, doctoral thesis, supra note 68, at 161.
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approach, endorsed by Albertyn and Goldblatt,77 is indeed an improvement on
the formal approach to equality where the law treats all individuals as if they
were the same, but it does not go far enough in its recognition of difference and
dialogue. Substantive interpretations of equality may also easily become
formalised and instrumentalised again and may in this way once again become
just another ‘universal’ test that reduces the multiplicity of lived experienced of
unfair discrimination to a set of factors to be decided by a court of law. An
alternative to both formal and substantive equality is an ethical interpretation
of equality. This interpretation does not seek to reduce or violate difference, but
urges us always to strive for an unknowable equality and an impossible justice.
This does not invalidate our search for equality and justice, but prevents the
complacency and conformism that Douzinas warns us against.
Once we have embraced the ethical, we have a duty to make wise and
responsible choices taking into account at all times the concrete situatedness of
the other appearing before the law. This will take us beyond the classical legal
conceptualisation of a dual system where things are divided into contrasting
spheres or polar opposites, such as rational/emotional where the first is
privileged over the second. The aim should be to transcend dichotomies, but a
reconciled whole holds the danger of reducing otherness and thereby forecloses
the possibility of an ethical relationship. We therefore need to continue to play
out our gender roles differently and this may be a way of transcending the
hierarchical dichotomies we have inherited.
It is my submission that this interpretation of equality has much in common
with the jurisprudence of care where I argue that an ethic of care be inserted
into the law. The following are the central premises to my argument:
• We need to listen to the other and embrace her differences;
• We need to considering the social context of both the individual and her
community; and
• We been to move beyond an abstract conception of justice in order to
embrace an ethic of care.
These alternative suggestions (there may be many more) encourage legal
and social responsibility when faced the other, when making legal/moral
judgments, and when interpreting, critiquing and transforming the law. This
responsibility should not lead to ethical and political quietism, but requires an
77
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understanding of each person as a unique being among other unique beings. To
move beyond the long-standing tension between theory and activism/praxis, it
is simply enough to accept that both are necessary. To illustrate, gender has to
be acknowledged, but the ego can never be reduced to a gender. In order to
acknowledge who I am I need to acknowledge my situation and position as a
woman, but I cannot be reduced to that position or situation, as it is constantly
in motion as my everyday encounters with others shape my own understanding
of being-in-the-world.

VI. Retracing the Way
To reiterate, the path we traverse together begins with a critique of
enlightenment values and western legalism/formalism/positivism which leave
no spaces for the voices of those who do not fit safely, comfortably and easily
into current legal categories or predetermined meanings and definitions.
Related to this is the historical adoption of formal interpretations of equality
which ignore social, political, economic and cultural situatedness dependent on
relations of power and the devaluation of the ‘feminine’ and care. I have thus
offered up for inspection feminist challenges to dominant legal conventions and
argued that traditional methods of legal reasoning may systematically silence
the voices of those who do not speak the abstract, neutral and objective
language of the law. It is ultimately an appeal for an openness to that which is
still to be said and a reflection on the dangers of complacency.78
Since 1994 the South African constitutional dispensation has offered us
promises of something better to come. In line with this more open approach to
the law and human rights discourse, the Constitutional Court has turned to a
more contextual understanding of the impact of laws on human well being,
resulting in the adoption of a substantive interpretation of equality. It is
submitted above that this approach does not reach far enough beyond the status
quo. For this reason, I support an ethical interpretation of gender equality that
focuses on utopian possibilities and the opening up the horizons of continued
transformative and relational thought.
Current western, masculine jurisprudential thought must be questioned in
order to encourage transformative thought and the careful consideration of new
possibilities which allow us to hear the call of the other and to face our endless
Van Marle, supra note 5, at 621 issues a warning against the tendency of the law and human
rights discourse to “capture” life and mourns the absence of contestation in post-apartheid
constitutionalism.
78
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To allow, thus, for a

“To become enraptured in a language already there signifies an exile with
regard to an approach of the near. More than the adequation of the thing to the
word, of the word to the thing, such a path demands forgetting words
previously defined, progressing beyond their frontiers and asking language
itself how it can allow acceding to proximity”.80
This blossoming would be dependent on a sense of wonder and hope. Once
we have acknowledged our anger and discomfort at unfair discrimination and
the silencing of those in pain, we are able then to approach others with a sense
of wonderment. We wonder when we are moved by that which we face.
Wonder is thus “the motivating force behind mobility in all its dimensions” and
it energises the hope of transformation, and the will for politics.81 Wonder and
hope open up spaces for the theory and politics of transformation and keeps
something open which may be unimaginable in the present. Sara Ahmed
expresses the workings of the passions of anger, wonder and hope as follows:
“Through the work of listening to others, of hearing the force of their pain
and energy of their anger, of learning to be surprised by all that one feels
oneself to be against; through all of this … an attachment is made.”82
Here is hoping that in moving beyond traditional concepts of western
legalism we learn to reach out in love and wonderment to those who stand
before the law awaiting our attentiveness and responsiveness to their suffering,
without reducing them to helpless victims who need us to ‘save’ them.

As Goodwin, Poetic Reflections in Law, Race and Society, 10 GRIFFITH L. REV. 195, 195-196
(2001) reminds us, stories tell us about the myriad ways in which people live and allow those
who are legally and socially silenced to find their voices. The call of the other can thus be
heard via the media of oral history, journal entries, poetry, music (such as jazz) and novels.
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IRIGARAY, supra note 11, at 57.

81

IRIGARAY (1993), supra note 19, at 73.

AHMED, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EMOTION 188 (2004). Ahmed’s discussions about wonder
and hope are reminiscent of Cornell’s emphasis on the ‘not yet’.
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